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l1N THE SUPREME COURT 
of the 
ST ATE OF UT AH 
DUKA L .. JOHNSON, on behalf of 
lwrsell' and all other taxpayers of the 
Statt' of Utah, 
Plaintiff and Re::;pondcnt, 
-vs.-
STATI~ TAX COMMISSION OF 
U'rAH, 
Dcfeudant and Appellant. 
Case No. 10555 
APPELLANT'S BRIEF 
rrhis is an action for declaratory judgment wherein 
appdlant seeks to reform part of the judgment of the 
lower Court and affirm the remainder thereof. The 
is:me in controversy is ~when certain income tax rate 
increases become effective. 
DISPOSITION OF THE GASJ£ BY LO\VER COURT 
\Vith respect to the rights of the parties under H.B. 
No. 81, or what is now 59-14-2, U.C.A., 1953, the lower 
Conrt granted rt'8J>OndE>nt's motion for summary judg-
nwnt in the following terms: 
1. 11 here is no genuint> issue as to any ma-
terial fact alleged in the complaint. 
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2. That the income tax rates providPd in 
H.B. 81 ( 3Gth Legislature) do not av ply 
to the plaintiff Dona L. Johnson nor to 
other Utah income taxpayers ~who filPd an 
income tax return on or before Dt'ct•mbt'l' 
31, 1965. 
3. That Section 5 of H.B. 81 ( 36th Legisla-
ture) is not ambiguous and H.B. 81 as 
well as the statutes implementing said 
H.B. 81 do not violate provisions of th<' ' 
Utah or Federal Constitutions. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Appellant's appeal from that portion of the lower 
Court's judgment determining that the respondent and 
others filing 1965 income tax returns before January 1, 
1966, are entitled to pay tax at the rate8 existing prior 
to the enactment of H.B. No. 81. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The respondent is a calendar year taxpayer who 
earned income in the year 1965. This income is taxable by 
the State of Utah. 
The 1965 Utah Legislature passed an individual in-
come tax law \vhich in its final form was kn01\'n as H.B. 
No. 81. 
In an attempt to avoid the higher tax rates imposed 
by H.B. No. 81, Plaintiff and approximately 6,000 other 
citizens of this State filed 1965 calendar year income tax 
returns with the State Tax Commission before January 
1, 1966. 
rrhe 1'ax Co1111nission has adopted the position that 
tlw rate irn:n~ases apply to income for all taxable yearn 
commencing on or after January 1, 1965. 
The respondent on the other hand contends that the 
rate increases established by H.B. No. 81 do not eff ec-
tively apply to returns filed before January 1, 1966, for 
1965 calendar year income. 
ln addition the Tax Commission ha::; allowed fiscal 
year taxpayers with fiscal year8 ending in 1965 to pay 
at previously existing rates. In certain isolated instances 
the Commission has also allowed calendar year taxpayers 
to make returns before January 1, 1966, based on the 
prior rates. In the latter case, such returns were accepted 
subject to audit and possible judicial review. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE 1965 UTAH LEGISLATURE INTENDED THAT 
THE INCOME TAX RATE INCREASE IMPOSED BY H.B. 
NO. 81 SHOULD APPLY TO THE NET INCOME OF A 
CALENDAR YEAR TAXPAYER EARNED DURING 1965. 
The lower Court has held that most 1965 calendar 
year taxpayers must pay the new or higher rates of 
tax on their 1965 income. At the same time, it has held 
that those 1965 calendar year taxpayers who filed returns 
before January 1, 1966, need not pay such rates. 
In other words, the Court has said that H.B. No. 
81 is effective to impose a tax on all calendar or fiscal 
·' ('UX incomes after January l, 1965, if such taxpayer8 
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don't file before ,January 1, 1966. However the Court 
then says that H.B. No. 81 is eff('etive J anuarv 1 19GG 
0 .J ' ' 
as far as 1965 calendar year income taxpayers are con-
cerned, providing such taxpayers file their returns be-
fore that time. 
The net result of the Court's decision is that a f e\\-
taxpayers are allowed to determine whether or not they 
want to be subject to the rate increases, but tens of thom;-
ands of others, who could not prepare and file returns 
or ascertain income before January 1, 1966, have no 
choice in whether or not they will pay at the new rates. 
Appellant cannot conceive that any court could at-
tribute such an intention to the legislature or give such 
an interpretation to the statute. 
'The statute does not say that taxpayers filing re-
turns before January 1, 1966, are not required to pay 
the higher rate. It does not say that by filing early, if in 
fact this can be done, they can or must pay the lower rate. 
Judge Ellett in the case of Allan E. M echarn, et al 
v. State Tax Comniission, No. 10410, now pending before 
this Court, ruled that the statute was clear and that the 
legislature intended the rate increases to apply to cal-
endar and fiscal year incomes earned after .T anuary l, 
1965. If this is true, then appellant cannot comprehend 
how the lower Court in this case can have held that for 
early filers the rate increase only apply to 1966 calendar 
year income. 
It is the net income in a calendar year which is taxed 
under the laws of this State. The presence or absencP 
5 
of a return has never been deemed significant in deter-
mining the rate of tax which would be applicable to a 
particular year's net income. Appellant might ask, what 
if a taxpayer filed no return at all for the calendar year~ 
Would the respondent say that the new rates would not be 
applicable because no return ~was filed? Under Section 
5 of H.B. No. 81 as inteqJreted by respondent and upheld 
lJy the lower Court, the new rate would not apply until 
a return was filed. 8uch a premium placed on filing the 
return might open the door to tax evasion such as this 
~tate has never seen. 
Appellant submits that the legislature clearly did 
not intend such a result. Legislative intent in this regard 
iti evidenced from the statute itself. Chapter 125, Laws 
of Utah, 1965, which was enacted by the 1965 Utah Legis-
lature as H.B. No. 81, provides in part: 
"There shall be levied, collected and paid for 
each taxable year upon the net income of every 
resident of the State, a tax equal to the sum of 
the following : 
Here the Legislature inserted the rate increases as 
established for various income categories. Then the 
statute continues : 
"The tax rates provided for herein shall ap-
ply to all returns filed on or after J anaury 1, 
1966, for taxable years commencing on or after 
.January 1, 1965." 
A taxable year is defined by Section 59-14-1 U.C.A. 
1 %3, as follows: 
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"The term 'taxable year' mean:::; the calendar 
year, or the fiscal year ending during ::-;ud1 cal-
ender year upon the basis of which the net in-
come is computed under this chapter. 'Taxabk 
year' includes, in the case of a return made for a 
fractional part of a year under the provisions 
of this chapter, or under regulations prescribed 
by the tax commission, the period for which such 
return is made. 'Fiscal year' means an accounting 
period of twelve months, ending on the last day 
of any month other than December." 
It appears clear that the Legislature intended, at 
the very least, to impose increased income tax rates on the 
net incomes of Utah residents earned during calendar or 
fiscal years commencing after January 1, 19G5. 
In other words, the incidence of the Utah income 
tax is a taxable year's income and the legislature deter-
mined that returns filed to report income earned during 
taxable years commencing on or after January 1, 19G5, 
would be taxable at the new rates. It expressly stated 
that these rates would apply to all returns filed on or 
after January 1, 1966, for such taxable years. 
However, it is contended by the taxpayer m this 
case that an income tax return filed prior to January 
1, 1966, can avoid the increased rate of income tax even 
though the legislature has expressly determined that her 
1965 calendar year income should be taxed at increased 
rates. 
This contention is based upon a narrow and limited 
reading of Section 5 creating a negative inference that 
returns filed prior to January 1, 19GG, c1ualify for the old 
7 
rnt<'. The taxpayer jnteqmc'ts the statute in question to 
sa~· that only return::-; filed after January 1, 1966, are 
subject to the new rates. 
'l1hi:s inference is unfounded. It is income that is 
:subject to tax, not returns. lf the legislature has clearly 
deten11ined that all HJG5 calendar year income is to be 
wb,jected to increa:sed tax rate::-; then the Court cannot 
negate that intention by relying on a negative inference 
arising from au i8olated portion of the statute. 
l LB. No. 81, is explicit in stating that taxpayer in-
come for each taxable year is to be taxed at the new 
rate8 establi8hed by that statute. The new rates became 
effective in 1965 and under Section 59-14-1, U.C.A., 1953, 
apply to the taxable, i.e. calendar year, income of that 
year. 
Section 59-14-19 provides in part: 
"Payment of Tax. -
"When Due. 
" ( 1) Except as provided in Section 59-14-37 
( 2), the total amount of tax imposed by this 
chapter shall be paid on the 15th day of April 
following the close of the calender year, or if the 
return should be made on the basis of a fiscal 
year, then on the 15th day of the fourth month 
following the close of the fiscal year. 
8ection 5 of H.B. Ko. 81 itself provides support for 
the proposition that the legislature intended that the 
rate increase apply to income for all taxable years start-
1nµ; on or after .January l, 1965. It is suggested that the 
8 
controversial language of this :Section was only intended 
to provide guide lines for fiscal year taxpayers and to 
establish that all fiscal year taxpayers filing on or after 
January 1, 1966, should pay the new rates. 
It is submitted that the plain and obvious intent 
of the 1965 legislature was to impose increased rates of 
income taxation on all yearly income earned after Jan-
uary 1, 1965, by either fiscal year or calendar year tax-
payers. 
It is also submitted that the legislature did in fact 
determine such income should be taxed at increased rates 
after January 1, 1965, for calendar year taxpayers and 
at increased rates for all fiscal years beginning after 
January 1, 1965. If this is true, then the date of filing 
returns for 1965 calendar year income cannot determine 
the rate of tax applicable to such income. 
POINT II 
A CALENDAR YEAR TAXPAYER CANNOT FILE A 
LEGAL INCOME TAX RETURN PRIOR TO THE END OF 
THE CALENDAR YEAR IN WHICH INCOME IS EARNED 
WITHOUT CHANGING HIS ACCOUNTING PERIOD. 
Section 59-14-17, U.C.A., 1953, provides in part: 
"Returns shall be made to the state tax com-
mission on or before the 15th day of April in each 
year, if the return is made on the basis of the 
calendar year, or if the return is made on the 
basis of the fiscal year, then ~within three rnontl1~ 
and fifteen days following the close of the fiscal 
" year ... 
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It i8 8Ubmitted that thi8 8tatute contemplates the 
filing of returns only after the close of the calendar or 
fiscal year for which they are required to be filed. In 
the case of fi8C'.al year returns this requirement is ex-
plicit. Calendar year returns Ly necessary implication 
(•.an only be filed after the clo8e of the calendar year. 
rrhe tax commis8ion'8 po8ition in this regard is fully 
:supported by Section 59-1-1-17, U.C.A., 1953. It is re-
quired therein that returns ba8ed on calendar year in-
come "8hall be made ... on or before the 15th day of 
April of each year ... " (Emphasis Added). A return 
filed in December, 1965, for the calendar year 1965 would 
not satisfy this requirement in that it would not be made 
in the same year as the April 15 filing deadline. 
The question is often asked if a taxpayer having 
completed his income transactions prior to the end of 
a calendar year cannot then file a return for such income 
if it is completely ascertainable. 
The statutes make special provision for short period 
returns or for taxpayers who desire to change from a 
calendar to a fiscal year basis. Section 59-14-14 provides: 
"If a taxpayer changes his accounting period 
from fiscal year to calendar year, from calendar 
year to fiscal year, or from one fiscal year to 
another, the net income shall, with the approval 
of the tax commission, be computed on the basis of 
such new accounting period, subject to the pro-
visions of Section 59-14-15." 
8ections 59-14-1 ( 4 ), 59-14-12 and 59-14-15, U.C.A., 
1 !l:-i:~. al:-;o establi8h rules for filing 8hort period or 
10 
fractional yt•ar returns and for t>stahlislting or dianging 
accounting veriods. In eaeh ease any d<>parture from a 
calPndar yPar filing is conclitiorn1d upon obtaining the 
approval of the tax commission and the (•xistenc(~ of a 
valid reason for cutting short the taxpayer's ealendar 
year. 
No such reason exisb in the present case. -Without a 
valid reason and without the prior approval of the tax 
commission, returns submitted to the commission before 
the end of the taxpayer's cal(•ndar year are not properly 
filed and are subject to a deficiency assessment after 
April 15 in that year if improperly paid or computed. 
Legislative intention in this regard is clear both 
from the plain meaning of the statute governing filing 
and from a reading of the tintire act. 8ection 5 of H.B. 
No. 81 does not purport to determine this question. rro 
allow such a determination by negative inference is to 
disregard specific statutory language as well as long 
established practices, thereby thwarting legislative in-
tention. This the Court should not do. 
POINT III 
IT IS CONSTITUTIONALLY PERMISSIBLE TO IMPOSE 
DIFFERENT INCOME TAX RATES ON CALENDAR YEAR 
TAXPAYERS THAN ON FISCAL YEAR TAXPAYERS. 
lt is a familiar fact that income tax rates tend to 
vary from one year to another. 'J1he qrn•stion of when 
such rate ehanges are to b(~ put into pffect is Olll' for tlte 
Legi::.:;lature. The problem is cornplieated beeause sn('li 
11 
<·li~rng-<·s unrnt eoincid<· with the legal incidence of the tax. 
Language uf a provision inereasing a tax rate which did 
not eorrespond with other prnvisions establishing the 
taxabl<' period \rould rn·('.es::-;arily be meaningless. 
rrlte proeedure adopted by the Utah Legislature, 
upon enacting H.B. .Ko. 81 was to impose increased tax 
rates on i1wome Parned during taxable years commenc-
ing 011 ur after January 1, 1965. 
The ef feet of Jf.B. No. 81 is to require all calendar 
year taxpayers to pay the increased rates after January 
1, l9G5. However, the increased rates are only imposed 
on fiseal year taxpayers as their fiscal years commence 
some time in 1965. Thus most of the income earned by a 
taxpayer on a N overnber, 1964:, to November, 1965, year, 
would be taxed at the rates in existence prior to the en-
actment of H.B. No. 81. At the same time all of the 1965 
inc01ne earned by a calendar year taxpayer would be 
taxed at the re\v rates1 according to the interpretation 
given to H.B. No. 81 by the State 'Tax Commission. 
It is contended by the taxpayer that it is unconstitu-
tional to impose the increased rates upon her and at 
the same time allmv fiscal year taxpayers to report part 
of their 1965 income at lower rates. 
The taxpayer's vrotest in this regard overlooks the 
very natun' of the tax. The Utah tax is on the net in-
come of every resident of this State ditring each taxable 
year. See 59-14:-2, U.C.A., 1953. 
:Viscal yt>ar taxpayers have no taxable income until 
th<· dost> of their taxable year. This period, for fiscal 
12 
year taxpayers al-way:::; falls into varyrng parts of hru 
calendar years. 
The taxpayer apparently conknds that either thc1 
legislature cannot raise income tax rates or that it must 
tax all income earned after January 1, 19G5, at the ne\r 
rates to both calendar and fiscal year taxpayers alike. 
Either result is chaotic. 
The first is contrary to practice which is both his-
torically established and judicially approved. The legis-
lature does have the right to change tax rates as the 
public welfare may require. Knights v. Treasurer & Be-
ceiver General, 237 Mass. 493, 130 N.E. 60, affirmed, 360 
U.S. 12, 43 S. Ct., 67 L. Ed. 192. 
The alternative result of the taxpayer's argument 
has the effect of taxing fiscal year taxpayers on calen-
dar year receipts whether or not such receipts ultimately 
result in income 
While the legislature could have required fiscal year 
taxpayers to pro-rate their tax based upon the portion of 
taxable inL'.ome earned in each of tvrn different calendar 
years, its failure to do so cannot make the act untonsti-
tutional. In order to establish a pro-ration of tax so as to 
promote absolute equality, it would have been neces:::;ary 
to impose a complicated and intricate formula upon 
fiscal year taxpayers. An example of such a formula 
is the following, used by the Federal Government in re-
cent years: 
Section 21 (a) IRC, 1954, provide:::; in part: 
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lf any rate of tax im~wsed by this chapter 
changes, and if the taxable year includes the ef-
l'ecti ve date of the change (unless that date is the 
first day of the taxable year), then ... 
" ( 1) tentative taxes shall be computed by 
applying the rate for the period before the effec~ 
tive date of the change, and the rate for the period 
on and after such date, to the taxable income for 
the entire taxable year; and 
'' ( 2) the tax for such taxable year shall be 
the sum of that proportion of each tentative tax 
which the number of days in each period bears 
to the number of days in the entire taxable 
year .... " 
But there is no requirement of absolute equality or 
uniformity in income taxation. As long as a discrimina-
tion is not arbitrary or capricious, it does not fall within 
a constitutional prohibition. Lawrence v. State Tax Com-
mission, 286 U.S. 276, 52 S. Ct. 556, 76 L.Ed. 1102 ! 
W clch v. Henry, 305 U.S. 134, 59 S.Ct. 121, 83 L. Ed. 87. 
The Federal Government and may of the states have 
enacted statutes for all practical purposes indentical with 
H.B. No. 81 or Chapter 25, Laws of Utah, 1965. In these 
cases fiscal year taxpayers have been accorded the same 
treatment as that established by the 1965 Utah Legisla-
hHe in the interests of order and simplification of filing 
requirements. 
rrhe Revenue Act of 1932 provided in Section 1: 
'' ( 1) The provisions of this title shall apply 
onlv to the taxable year 1932 and succeeding tax-. . 
able years ... " 
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Section 1-1 of the same act established a pro-ration 
formula for computing the tax where the fiscal year 
period embraced years with different tax lmrn. Similar 
provisions were found in some previous Revenue Acts. 
However in 193-1, Revenue Act 1934, 26 U.S.iC.A. ~1 1 
the treatment of fiscal year taxpayers was changed. That 
act provided : 
"The provisions of this title shall apply only 
to taxable years beginning after December 31, 
1933 ... " See 48 Stat. 683. 
No pro-rata formula of any kind was included in 
the act, and it was not applicable to the portions of 
fiscal year taxpayers' incomes arising during fiscal years 
beginning in 1933. Similar treatment has been given to 
fiscal year taxpayers by the State of New York. See 
Laws N.Y. 1922, C. 427 § 2; McKinney's Consolidated 
Laws of New York, 59 § 371. 
The procedure adopted by the Utah Legislature 
therefore has well established historical antecedents. It 
has the virtue promoting order, eliminating confusion 
in administration of the tax and facilitating the compu-
tation of taxpayer income. 
As these results are legitimate legislative ends, it is 
submitted that the failure of the legislature to promote 
absolute equality between fiscal and calendar year tax-
payers is not of great importance. 
All that is necessary is that all taxpayers that are 
similarly situated be treated alike. 
15 
1 t is not even necL•s..,;ary that all calendar year tax-
pay<'rs pay the same rah'. A graduated tax imposing a 
different rate of tax upon different amounts of income 
n•cei ved during the same calendar year is even pennis-
sihle as long as the classification is reasonable. 8ee 
State Buard of Ta:r Cum'rs. of Ind. v. Jackson, 283 U.S. 
527, 51 8.Ct. 5±0, 75 L.Ed. 1248. 
Jn that case an excise statute levying a tax on retail 
stores was upheld. Another provision of the statute grad-
uated the tax rate upward in the case of multiple-owned 
stores. ln sustaining this differential rate the United 
mates 8uprerne Court stated that there was sufficient 
difference in the method of doing business to justify a 
separate classification for the different groups. 
rrl1e Supreme Court set forth additional guide lines 
for determining proper tax classifications in the case of 
TV elch v. Henry, 59 S.1Ct. 121; 305 U.S. 13±; 83 L.Ed. 87. 
It was there stated: 
"Any classification of taxation is permissible 
which has reasonable relation to a legitimate end 
of governmental action." 305 U.S. 144. 
1The Court continued: 
"It is a common place that the equal protec-
tion clause does not require a state to maintain 
rigid rules of equal taxation, to resort to close 
distinctions, or to maintain precise scientific uni-
formitv. Possible differences in tax burdens, not 
shown· to be substantial, or which are based on 
discrimination not shown to be arbitrary or ca-
pricious, do not fall within the constitutional pro-
hibition. Ibid. p. 145. 
16 
Where, as in the present case, there is a kgitimat~ 
government purpose served by allowing fiscal year tax-
payers to pay a different rate during the transitional 
period when a rate increase takes effect, it is submitte<l 
that such a legislative classification is reasonable and 
constitutional. 
POINT IV 
RULES OF STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION ADOPTED 
BY THIS COURT FURNISH SUPPORT FOR THE TAX COM-
MISSION'S POSITION HEREIN. 
It must be noted that general rules of construction 
apply with respect to judicial constructions of taxing 
statutes. See 82C.J.S. Statutes §396. Thus it can be 
definitively stated that a statute will not be construed 
so as to defeat its evident object or purpose. Dif;nn v. 
Bryan, 77 Utah 604, 299 P. 253. 
The fundamental rule of statutory construction is 
to ascertain and give effect to the intention of the legis-
lature. Inclu0trial Comniission of Utah v. Daly Mining 
Co., 51 Utah 602, 172 P. 301; Norville v. State Tax Com-
mission, 98 Utah 170, 97 P. 2d 937. 
Where the language of a statute 1s plain and its 
meaning clear, the court will not look beyond the lan-
guage of the statute itself to ascertain its meaning. In 
Re Stevens' Estate, 102 Utah 255, 130 P. 2d 85. However, 
where the words of a statute are not explicit, the inten-
tion of the legislature will prevail over the literal sen~~ 
of its terms, and intention will be determined from tlw 
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context, from tlw occa::-;ion and necessity for the law 
according to what is con::-;onant with reason and good 
discretion. lto1.rlf!J i:. Pu/Jlic Service Comm., 112 Utah 
U li, 185 P. 2d 51-±; A'ame:-; v. Boa.rd of Cum' rs. of Cache 
Co., 5S Utah ±95, 199 P. 970. 
While the Tax l;o111111is::-;ion does not concede that 
the words of the statute are unclear, yet the conflicting 
pusi ti on::-; of the parties herein may compel the court to 
conclude that time for the rate increase established by 
Ch. 125, Laws of Vtah, 1965, is subject to two or more 
constructions. In this event the Utah Supreme Court has 
srt forth further guide lines which should be used in 
interpreting this law. 
Where an act is subject to two or more interpreta-
tions, the court should construe it to give effect to its 
purpose. Ralph Child Construction Co. v. State Tax 
Commission, 12 Utah 2d 53, 362 P. 2d 422; Driggs v. 
Utah State Teachers Retirement Board, 105 Utah 417, 
142 P. 2d 657. 
Where part of a statute is subject to two construc-
tions, the court will not construe a particular provision 
of it so as to neutralize or modify other parts of the 
same act if any other construction is possible. Construc-
tion should be consistent with the entire act. Miles v. 
TV ells, 22 Utah 55, 61 P. 53±; See also W cstern Coal and 
Mining Co. v. Hilbert, 63 Ariz. 171, 160 P. 2d 331. 
The court has a duty to reconcile apparent inconsis-
t(•neic•::-; \\'here possible, but where this cannot be done 
it must ascertain and follow legislative intent if ascer-
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tainable. Spring Canyon Coal Co. v. Industriul Conimi0-
sion of Utah, 57 Utah 208, 193 P. 821. 
The court will avoid a construction of a statute which 
will result in confusion or uncertainty. M asich v. U.8. S. 
R. & M. Co., 113 Utah 101, 191 P. 2d 612, app. dismissed, 
335 U.S. 866, 69 S.iCt. 138, 93 L.Ed. ±11, Rehearing de-
nied, 335 U.S. 905, 69 S.Ct. 405, 93 L.Ed.439. 
Likewise the courts will grant every presumption in 
favor of the constitutionality of a statute and will not 
accord an unconstitutional interpretation to a legislative 
enactment if any other interpretation would sustain the 
act. Tintic Standard ill in. Co. v. Utah County, 80 Utah 
491, 15 P. 2d 633; Howe v. State Tax COJnrnission, 10 
Utah 2d 362, 353 P. 2d 468. 
The purpose, subject matter, context, legislative 
history and executive interpretation of a statute are aids 
to construction which may indicate intent. Sinclair Re-
fining Co. v. State Tax Cornrnission, 102 Utah 340, 130 
P. 2d 663. 
In attempting to ascertain legislative intent the 
courts have the duty to look to the history of the legisla-
tion and the reasons for its passage. Board of Education 
of Ogden City v. Hunter, 48 Utah 373, 159 P. 1019. 
And where, as in the present case, the legislative 
intent is established, and the only question is the effect 
to be given to an alleged inconsistent provision which 
does not conform to that policy and intent, such a pro-
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yision rn nugator:·. lVcst Beverage Co. u. llanse11, 98 
Uah :3:3:.~, 9(i P. :Zd 1105. 
1t is not proper to determine legi8lative intent from 
isolatc>d or di8('0unected part8 of a 8tatute. W rat hall v. 
Jol111suu, 8G Utah 50, JO P. 2d 755. 
On('e the intention of the legislature is clear and 
language of the 8tatutc defined, another rule of Utah 
statutory con8truction urn8t be discussed. That is the 
\rell established principle that the application of revenue 
statutes will he strictly construed against the taxing 
authority and in favor of the taxpayer. See W. F. Jensen 
Caudy Co. v. State Tax Commission, 90 Utah 359, 61 P. 
:2d 629. 
rrhe reason for this rule is that the courts will not 
burden the citizens of this state with taxes or restrict 
their enjoyment of property where there is doubt that 
such taxes or restrictions were intended by the legis-
lature. 
But the rule of strict construction should not be ap-
plied to defeat the legislative purpose or so as to lead 
to impractical, unfair and unreasonable results. Norville 
L'. State Tax Commission, 98 Utah 170, 97 P. 2d 937, 126 
ALR 1318. 
Where, as in the present case, the legislature has 
determined that the 1965 income of all calendar year tax-
1myers should be taxed at increased rates, the rule of 
:-;trict construction dot>8 not apply. This is not a case of 
l'.\t<>rnling the plain meaning of a revenue act to tax 
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something it is uncertain whethm· or not was intended to 
be taxed by the legislature. 
On the contrary, here it is certain that the legisla-
ture intended to subject calendar year income after Jan-
uary 1, 19G5, to increased tax rates. In this case an indi-
vidual taxpayer is claiming exemption, because of a 
technicality, from the general operation of a revenue act. 
In such a circumstance a different rule of statutory con-
struction comes into effect, namely that of strict con-
struction of exemption statutes. 
Here the taxpayer concedes that those taxpayers 
filing after January 1, 1966, must pay the increased rate. 
But it is contended that this increased rate is not im-
posed upon those few calendar year taxpayers who were 
able to compute and file a tax return prior to January 
1, 1966. Thus an exemption from the rate increase is at-
tributed to the 1965 legislature. 
But it is well established in this state that where a 
statute purports to establish an exemption from the gen-
eral application of a revenue law, such exemption pro-
vision is to be strictly construed against the one who 
asserts the claimed exemption. Norville v. State Tax 
Commission, 98 Utah 170, 97 P. 2d 937. 
1The presumption is that all exemptions intended to 
be granted were granted in express terms and language 
relied upon as creating the exemption must be so clear 
as not to admit of reasonable controversy about ib 
meaning. All doubts must be resolved against the exe111p-
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tion, and Pxemptiom; will not be aided by judicial inter-
pretati011. Judge v. 8peuccr, 15 Utah 2-±2, -±8 P. 1097; 
Porker v. (Juinn, 23 Utah 332, (jJ P. 961; Elks v. Groes-
{;cck, +o Utah 1, 120. 192; N orvillc v. State Tax Commis-
sion, ~)8 Utah 170, 97 P. 2d 937. 
Applying these rules, it is submitted that the stat-
utes do not specifically authorize an exemption for the 
plaintiff herein. In fact, the only authority for plaintiff's 
position herein is founded on a negative inference which 
may render the statute discriminatory and invalid. Clear-
ly, this is not :sufficient to grant plaintiff the relief 
sought. Therefore, the Court should find that all cal-
Pndar year taxpayers must pay the increased income 
tax rates as intended by the 1965 Utah Legislature. 
POINT V 
WHERE AN INCOME TAX LIABILITY IS CLEARLY 
ESTABLISHED BY STATUTE, THE STATUTE WILL PRE-
VAIL OVER AN ADMINISTRATIVE INTERPRETATION 
THEREOF. 
It may be contended that the State Tax Commission 
has accepted isolated income tax returns filed with it 
during the year 1965 and accorded lower rates to such 
returns. In some instances, the filing of fractional or part 
year returns is allowed by the statute when a calendar 
year, for some reason, is terminated. In some cases where 
such returns have been filed, it is possible that the Com-
mission may have accorded lower rates to them. 
However, all returns filed with the Commission are 
~ubjPct to audit and in the event the rate increase or the 
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rate upon which such returns are based is not properly 
reflected in them, a defieiency accessment can be filed 
which will more accurately reflect the income due frorn 
those returns. 
The Commission has adopted this procedure in many 
instances and has been willing to take any returns sub-
mitted to it without initial questioning as to their pro-
priety or legality. After such returns are reviewed by 
the 1Cornrnission's auditing division, it is the policy to 
send out deficiency assessments if the returns are not 
properly computed or paid. 
It is here sought to bind the Commission to the 
treatment given to certain isolated returns and to deter-
mine that such treatment, even though erroneous should 
be given to all returns regardless of when filed and re-
gardless of what the correct rates governing their filing 
should be. 
It is well established in this State that governmental 
agencies cannot deprive the courts of their judicial fun~ 
tion, nor can the agencies extend the operation of a 
statute by administrative regulation. Western Lea.tlier 
& Finding Company v. State Tax Commission, 87 Utah 
227, 48 Pac. 2d 526. 
The Commission is only empowered to make rules 
and regulations in conformity with the statutes and 
court decisions of the State of Utah. The legislative 
power, which appellant seeks here to attribute to th(' 
State Tax Commission, is more properly assigned !11 
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tile Legislatun~ of thl' ~tate of Utah by the L~tah Con-
~titution. Ftah Constitution Article YI, Section I. The 
L(•gislatur<~ is not pern1ittt>d to abdicate or transfer to 
otht•rs the ecsential lt>gislative function with ·which it 
is vested, and the Tax Commission has no desire to 
as:s1m1<• this function. In the ease of In Re Jones' Estate, 
99 Utah ;i{;), 10-t P. 2d 19-±1, this Court held that a stipu-
lation lwtm,·en the Attorney General for the State of 
nah and the attorney for a taxpayer did not bind the 
Statt· 'l1ax Commission, "where a statute clearly and un-
au1bignously fixes a tax liability." It was held that the 
statute was controlling on all of the parties subject to the 
tax in that case regardless of any rules or interpretation 
by the r:L'ax Commission. 
l t is well established that an interpretation or regu-
lation by a State administrative agency, such as the 
State Tax Commission, is only an administrative opinion 
as to what the statute under construction means. This 
is the holding of the Utah Supreme Court in the case of 
Utah Jiotcl Co. v. Industrial Comrnission, 107 Utah 2±, 
151 P. 2d ±67. The Court there stated: 
". . . [T]he administrative tribunal may, 
hy adopting a given regulation, only purport to 
interpret what the legislature meant by its stat-
utory language. Such a regulation is nothing but 
an administrative opinion as to what the statute 
means. 
"From the statements of the case in the briefs 
of counsel, it is clear that the so-called regulation 
under eonstruction in this case is nothing more 
than an initial guess by the administrative tri-
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bunal as to what the statute ... means ... All 
administrative interpretation out of harrnonv and 
contrary to the <'XlH'('SS provisions of a statut(' 
cannot be given weight. To do so would in effect 
amend the statute. Construction may not be suh-
stituted for legislation." 107 Utah 31. 
This Court also held in the case of Lewis v. Utah 
State Tax Cornniission, 118 t'tah 72, 218 P. 2d 1074, that: 
"An erroneous construction of a statute made 
by an administrative body is not binding upon 
this 1Court." 
The Tax Commission herein does not concede that it 
has erroneously construed the statute. It is submitted 
that in the few isolated cases wherein a tentative ap-
proval may have been given to the filing of a 1965 income 
tax return based upon the lower rates exisiting prior 
to H.B. No. 81 that such approval is only tentative. rrhe 
initial treatment to be given to a return is subject to 
audit by the Commission's auditing division and review 
by the quasi - judicial Tax Commission itself. 
In no sense is the treatment which has been given 
such returns to be considered final. However, even if 
the ·Court does determine that the Commission has ac-
corded treatment to some early returns which is incon-
sistent with the position that it now advocates shoulcl 
properly control, it is submitted that the interpretation 
of the Commission in either event cannot control the 
tax rate which should apply to said returns. Utah ca~c 
law is unanimously in accord that the tax rate to be paid 
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i~; tliat rate \\'hieh is due and payable under applicable 
l'tah statutes as determined by the court8. 
CONCLUSION 
'I1he 'rax Commission respectfully submits the Legis-
lature intended the increased rates provided by H.B. No. 
tll to apply to all income for taxable years commencing 
on or after January 1, l!:l65. To the extent that other 
language of thi8 statute is inconsistent with this result, 
it should be di~:ffegarded. The judgment of the lower 
Court should be rever:::;ed in part to reflect such a result. 
Respectfully submitted, 
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